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WORK-IN-PROGRESS

To Start a War:

NATO’s Failure to Pursue the Russia Option
during the Kosovo Crisis

Craig Scott 1

I. INTRODUCTION

What explains NATO’s decision to start an air campaign – a war – against Yugoslavia after the
Rambouillet peace process failed to lead to an agreement that would have addressed what was widely
perceived as an escalating humanitarian crisis in Kosovo? The present article seeks to approach that
question more on the oblique than in the round, namely by asking whether or not a more central
role for Russia prior to the start of the war could, and should, have been pursued. While more an
opinion essay than a review essay, this article does use as a jump-off point Tim Judah’s remarkable
behind-the-scenes reconstruction of events leading to war in his just-published Kosovo: War and
Revenge. 2 In tandem with interacting with Judah’s account and conclusions, an argument will also be
1
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Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). Kosovo picks up where

Judah left off in his award-winning The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1997). Both books deserve to be treated as contemporary classics. In his coverage of the
events in the Balkans in these books and in some five pieces written for the New York Review of Books
which form the core of Kosovo, Judah bridges the gap between high-quality descriptive journalism and
scholarship in the combined disciplines of political studies and history. And he does so not only insightfully
but also with narrative prowess.

advanced that the role of super-diplomat Richard Holbrooke could well have been problematic in
the signaling game that went awry in the early months of 1999, doing so in relation to the
implications of his having published a detailed account of his interactions with Yugoslavian
President Slobodan Milosevic in his memoir To End a War which dealt with Holbrooke’s place in
ending the fighting in Bosnia. 3 No claim is made that the facts unequivocally support the arguments
made herein and it is acknowledged they have, to some extent, a speculative quality, but it is claimed
that the arguments are more than plausible – and certainly plausible enough to invite further thought
and research by international relations and diplomatic history scholars.

II. STREET CRED: RAMBOUILLET AND RUSSIA

In the last part of The Serbs, Judah had noted the rise of a new force in Kosovo in 1995 – the Kosvo
Liberation Army or KLA (in Albanian, the Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves, or UCK). 4 The KLA was
largely opposed to the conflict-avoiding approach of Rugova and given to armed insurrection. In
Kosovo, Judah has gone on to piece together in considerable depth the amazing story of how the
KLA morphed from being a rag-tag group of Kosovar exiles to being an insurgent movement that
assumed a pivotal role in resisting Serb repression. And in deliberately provoking that repression so
as to make more likely exactly what did happen: NATO intervention and the cessation of Belgradebased rule in Kosovo. Judah suggests, plausibly, that the KLA thereby turned out to be "the most
successful guerrilla movement in modern history." 5
Making extensive and liberal use of behind-the-scenes sources and unpublished quotations
from key actors, Judah adopts a chronological approach to his account of the fateful web of
decisions and miscalculations of all actors other than the KLA (NATO, Clinton, Russia, Milosevic)
that led to the descent into war. The key narrative is the West's handling of the process in the
French town of Rambouillet in which diplomats herded together both Serbian officials and a
fractious group of Kosovars, including Rugova and KLA leader Hashim Thaci, and attempted to
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broker a peace agreement that would restructure Serbia's constitutional order with respect to
Kosovo and insert NATO troops to enforce the agreement. Judah makes certain to note the
deliciousness of the choice of locale: “By chance, Rambouillet, an otherwise prosperous, suburban
town, is home to the French Bergerie Nationale, which translates roughly as the National Sheep Pen or
Sheep Farm.” 6
It is the chapter devoted to these Rambouillet negotiations that is the most insightful and
valuable contribution to the study of war and diplomacy in Kosovo. 7 The aptly-named chapter,
“Agreement for Peace,” is superbly executed. Despite not having been inside the process, Judah
reconstructs what happened in engaging detail. This chapter reads like high drama. It is full of
colourful characters, a fascinating plotline and fabulous images of desperate diplomatic strategies
(such as conference host France's removal of caviar and cognac when the time came for the screws
to be tightened). But the chapter is also at the core of Judah’s analysis of history on the fly. It is
pivotal in grounding his conclusion that NATO leaders felt, at a certain point, that they had virtually
no choice but to bomb Serbia. NATO’s American-led strategy – threaten force if Serbia did not
‘agree’ to Rambouillet – meant at a certain point that NATO’s credibility became as much the issue
as securing either peace or justice in Kosovo.
Linked to his assessment of the credibility factors is Judah's view that NATO's intervention
is best explained as a modern variant of gunboat diplomacy and not as having been motivated by
humanitarian goals – at least not initially. 8 Under the influence of the United States’ legal theory of
its wide powers to use military might absent UN Security Council authorization and pushed by the
pugnacious leadership of Madeleine Albright and others such as Richard Holbrooke, NATO had
slipped into an ultimatum strategy that borrowed from the lessons commonly drawn as to how the
war in Bosnia is thought to have ended. That lesson: threaten Milosevic with force and he will climb
down if that threat is credible given that he had thrown in the towel so quickly after NATO air raids
on Bosnian Serb Army positions had made good on Holbrooke’s delivery of the threat to do just
that. (Aided, as noted by Judah in The Serbs, in no small part by military surges and territorial
recoveries by the Croatian and Bosnian national armies, breakthroughs that took advantage of the
NATO air raids having hit Bosnian Serb Army fuel dumps and incapacitated its military
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communications network. 9 ) Yet, at Rambouillet, NATO’s threats were to use force unless Serbia
‘agreed’ to the Rambouillet text on more or less a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 10 Force was not
threatened with the more limited goal of having Serbia stop atrocities in Kosovo and come to the
negotiating table, as had been the purpose of the NATO threat strategy during the Bosnia war that
led to Serbia coming to the Dayton Peace Conference on its own behalf and that of the Bosnian
Serbs. In the Kosovo context, when Serbia refused to accede to Rambouillet – to no large extent
because it refused to accept a NATO force on its territory – NATO leaders felt the organisation’s
credibility had been irreversibly engaged. 11 Bombing of Serbia was required to maintain credibility,
including of course the credibility of future threats made as part of a tactic of gunboat diplomacy
that NATO – or states within it – might well wish to employ on other issues and in other areas.
When NATO’s bombing helped trigger an escalation of Serbia’s violence in, and Kosovars’ mass
exodus from, Kosovo, the motivation for bombing seemed to shift – perhaps conveniently, of
course – to a humanitarian one. 12 At the same time, that humanitarian focus was blurred as
NATO’s concern for its credibility simply shifted to another level: reverse the exodus or lose face.
Intertwined with Judah’s Rambouillet narrative, the second most important account in Kosovo
is of the role that Russia played, quite possibly one of the most fateful examples of the consequences
of mixed messages in recent diplomacy. Judah details a fascinating scene in which various NATO
foreign ministers met on October 8, 1998, with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov in a VIP lounge at
Heathrow airport. 13 NATO and Russia tried to get their signals straight in a somewhat surreal
setting. As US envoy Holbrooke would later put it, debate raged as “British matrons served tea and
biscuits. It was mad.” 14 Ivanov insisted that NATO had to choose between a strategy of trying to
get UN Security Council’s prior authorisation for using force and of going ahead without Security
Council approval. If they did the former, Russia would veto any approval. But, if they did the latter,
they would be met by nothing worse than official histrionics from Moscow. According to Judah,
insiders present at the meeting report that Ivanov told the NATO diplomats that Russia would do
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nothing more than "make a lot of noise." 15 Not surprisingly, NATO strategists read this is an
apparent green light to NATO to use force without going to the UN. But, meanwhile, Judah
reports that sources in Belgrade claim that Russia had also given a green light of sorts to Milosevic
by leading him to believe that Russia would provide Serbia with anti-aircraft systems that would
make any air campaign a risky venture for NATO. 16 If these accounts are both true, then Russia's
cooperative role with both sides had pernicious results. Two greens do not make a red.
Eventually, two months into NATO’s bombing, Russian President Yeltsin felt
uncomfortable under domestic pressure from Russian nationalists and his military, each sector
angered by Russia's apparent marginalisation and weakness in the whole affair.

He decided that

Russia had to cooperate with NATO to find a way to end the war quickly. This was accomplished
in the form of an intriguing partnership of the White House's Strobe Talbot, Finnish President
Martti Ahtisaari, and former Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin. 17 This trio worked long into
many nights to craft a common strategy that came to include two differences from Rambouillet: that
the military force that would oversee Kosovo would have to be under UN auspices and some
Russian troops would have to be part of that force along with NATO troops. Ahtisaari and
Chernomyrdin then delivered a non-negotiable message, Ahtisaari being assigned the hard-cop role
of telling Milosevic that bombing would intensify and would target Serbia's civil infrastructure (such
as the telephone system) if he did not agree. 18 Milosevic saw no choice but to climb down and
accept defeat now that Russia was clearly not going to go to bat for Serbia, far less for him. NATO
and Russian troops entered Kosovo after Serb forces withdrew and ‘peace’ was secured.
Judah’s brilliant and painstaking reconstruction of events in Kosovo is not free of problems.
On key issues, Judah does not seem to have dug deeply enough into matters that are very important.
In particular, two absences stand out: the issue of whether signals from the Bosnia crisis over
NATO’s limited capacity to stay the course affected Milosevic’s willingness to have Serbia take a hit
from NATO; and the question of whether a Russian military role in implementing Rambouillet was
seriously considered at the time of Rambouillet or whether the Heathrow meeting had made that an
‘unnecessary’ consideration. To the extent these issues are touched upon by Judah, one is frustrated
by the circumspection, indeed obliqueness, with which Judah mentions key theories – such as the
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alleged Russian promise to provide air-defence systems to Serbia – without offering his view on the
strength of the theory or even a comment on the general credibility of the Belgrade-based sources of
this information.
III. TO START A WAR…?
At this stage of the account, one might wonder, not so parenthetically, whether most everyone in the
corridors of NATO’s Brussels headquarters had a copy of Richard Holbrooke’s memoir To End a
War shoved in their briefcases. 19

Holbrooke had been the diplomatic kingpin behind getting

Dayton to happen and then, once the peace talks were under way, knocking heads to secure the
necessary signatures on the war-ending agreement. When the Kosovo crisis broke, Holbrooke was
in retirement (at least, temporary retirement) from government, but was promptly recruited to come
back as the key emissary between NATO and Milosevic. 20 A favourite plot device of many an
adventure story is called to mind: ‘Richard, we know you’re out of this game, but we need you back
– no one else can do it’
What is the significance of Holbrooke’s diplomatic return to the Balkans for the path war
took over Kosovo? In To End a War, Holbrooke does not hold back on detailing his role in
executing the ultimatum strategy in the Bosnia context. He candidly reveals, seemingly revels in
revealing, how close run a thing it was that the US was able to browbeat other NATO governments
into taking the decision to bomb Bosnian Serb positions in response to Milosevic’s initial failure to
capitulate. 21 A whole book could be written on the ethics and (ir)responsibility of memoirs of this
kind by still-active high-level diplomats. But, in the present context, it suffices to wonder whether
not only NATO diplomats but also Slobodan Milosevic also kept a copy of Holbrooke’s book close
at hand, with passages underlined where Holbrooke revealed how near to a bluff had been the final
ultimatum to Milosevic that had preceded the NATO air raids on Bosnian Serb military
emplacements. Several years after these raids had brought him to the Dayton table, Milosevic was
again interacting with his Bosnia nemesis-cum-negotiating-partner and may well have been counting
on a similar inertia and level of discomfort on the part of NATO governments. As Judah would
suggest in Kosovo, Milosevic indeed seems to have calculated that a fragile NATO consensus on
bombing Serbia because of Serbia’s mounting violence in Kosovo would produce pinprick assaults,
19
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then a fracturing of solidarity and finally a cessation of bombing – with Milosevic emerging not only
intact but a shrewd hero in the eyes of the average Serbian. 22 However, he does not at all probe how
the lessons Milosevic drew from the pre-existing Milosevic-Holbrooke relationship may have been
affected by Holbrooke’s candid public record in To End a War of how his threat at the time of the
Bosnia crisis had been a near-bluff.
The argument, it should be emphasized, is not that Judah ignores the Holbrooke-Milosevic
diplomatic dance during the Kosovo crisis. Far from it. Judah places considerable emphasis on
Holbrooke’s account of how Milosevic did believe NATO threats this time precisely because NATO
had delivered on the threats during the Bosnia war. 23 Indeed, Judah gives Chapter 8 the title “You
Will Bomb Us,” a reference to what Holbrooke reports during an August 1999 BBC interview
Milosevic to have said to Holbrooke on March 22, 1999, after Holbrooke had told him: “‘You
understand what will happen when I leave here today if you don’t change your position, if you don’t
agree to negotiate and accept Rambouillet as the basis of the negotiation?’” 24 Even after Holbrooke
had emphasized that that the bombing would be “swift, severe, and sustained” (a punchy alliteration
he had worked out in advance with US military brass), Milosevic is said to have replied: “‘No more
engagement, no more negotiations, I understand that, you will bomb us. You are a great and
powerful country,’” – one can note how he did not speak of NATO as a great and powerful alliance
– “‘there is nothing we can do about it.’” 25 So, while Judah does surmise that Milosevic had indeed
believed bombing would come but not that it would be too serious or lasting, he does not explore
the possible sub-text stemming from what Milosevic may well have known, directly or indirectly,
from Holbrooke’s To End a War. Words: “You will bomb us.” Thoughts: But I have read your memoir.
It cannot last. NATO does not have the will or the guts to stick it out.
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IV. THE RUSSIA OPTION 26
Judah concludes that the reason war occurred was simple and yet another example of states’ and
their diplomats’ capacity to create self-perpetuating dynamics that allow the plunge into war to take
on a life of its own. In Judah’s view, “They all just got it wrong.” 27 Without gainsaying this emphatic
conclusion (correct as it is in its generality), the reader interested in evaluative appraisal of the
Kosovo crisis will derive little assistance from Judah’s resolute and more or less consistent avoidance
of a discussion of what could or should have been done differently to have avoided the devastation
that swept over Kosovo and Serbia in the wake of the Rambouillet failure. A certain normative
agnosticism prevails, keeping Kosovo almost entirely at the level of explanation, rather than critique.
This is not to take away from Judah’s accomplishment, indeed one that successfully blends
journalism with scholarship. As already indicated, Judah does yeoman service by revealing details of
Russia’s role that were generally unknown at the time by anyone other than close insiders. Yet, one
is left with a sense of too much attention having been paid by Judah to the Heathrow meeting, with
the implicit conclusion being that Russia had surreptitiously thrown its hat into NATO’s ring.
Indeed, Judah’s discussion of the Rambouillet negotiations does offer some insight into how
speaking for Russia is not as simple as Foreign Minister Ivanov speaking off the record to
diplomatic peers over tea and scones. Other strains of, and actors in, Russian politics did not
suddenly go away, and there remained a strong sense that “Russia” did not agree that this was
somehow NATO’s baby. 28 Russia continued to want a role reflective of both its perceived interests
and its need for a level of prestige, but NATO complacency after Heathrow seemed to make a
Russian role not so much a non-option as (a perceived) unnecessary one. It was not that Russia
could not have been more central to the Rambouillet process, but rather that it was uncritically
assumed that it need not be.
But, in the end as we have seen, NATO insisted at Rambouillet on the insertion of a NATO
force as part of any agreement, Serbia balked, and we ended up with zero-sum folly. The ‘deal’
Ahtissari brought to Milosevic after Yeltsin had delegated Chernomyrdin to work with NATO to
end the war had significant participatory elements for Russia, raising of course the query of many an
observer after the Serbian capitulation: could this not have been finessed as a solution at
A distilled version of this section has been published in an in-house publication of the University of
Toronto Faculty of Law: “Kosovo, the Russia Option and Chechnya” in (Fall/Winter 2000-01) Nexus 53-55.
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Rambouillet itself, and all the bloodshed and destruction thereby avoided? Here, though, it is
significant that Judah’s account does change the commonly-assumed picture of the outside observer
at the time that the West was completely ignoring Russia. We can now see how much fault Russia
itself bears for a more Russia-inclusive strategy not having been pursued at Rambouillet. But the
predominant factor still appears to be Western hubris and over-easy gravitation to sword-rattling as
a strategy simply because a more or less economically-beholden-to-the-West Russia had been
cornered on one occasion in the form of one person, Ivanov, in a Heathrow lounge. It is to the
failure of all sides to pursue a “Russia option” that the rest of this essay now turns.
◊◊◊
Recall that it was in early March of 1999 that the Rambouillet “agreement” structuring an
interim autonomy regime for Kosovo showed early signs of becoming a dead letter. Notably,
Yugoslavia seemed willing to live with a short-term solution of robust regional autonomy for
Kosovo, but was adamant it would not agree to NATO troops on its soil to oversee and enforce the
deal. However, news reports have Belgrade saying that Serbia would accept a substitution of Russian
(and Belarussian) troops for NATO troops, albeit adding the troublesome condition that Yugoslavia
must be admitted into these two states’ military alliance. 29 Judah fails to discuss this dimension, and
one can only assume he saw it as pure verbiage that made no impact on the Rambouillet actors. But,
were it not for Heathrowitis, Serbia’s move, whether or not initially a disingenuous ploy, could well
have triggered a need to re-think a Russian role.
In contrast to diplomatic complacency, it cannot be said that efforts were not made from
outside the interstate realm to have a Russia option looked at seriously and pursued. By their nature,
behind-the-scenes efforts in the diplomatic realm are not known to the present author, and, as yet,
no book appears to have been written – at least, in English -- by a diplomatic insider to Russia’s
handling of the Kosovo crisis. Behind the scenes after the initial Rambouillet breakdown (the
ultimatum period before the final Holbrooke warning on March 22), there were academics from the
fields of international relations and law -- as well as representatives of at least one leading
international humanitarian organisation -- who were crafting careful submissions to various NATO
capitols, to at least one Russian ambassador in those capitols, and to the Office of the UN SecretaryGeneral. 30 (On the latter score, the plea was for Kofi Annan to put his neck on the line to try to
broker a Russian role.) Yet, there is little evidence that Western powers took the Russia option
29
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seriously, let alone pursued it with any vigour, and Judah’s analysis provides no affirmative counterevidence that the option was considered post-Heathrow. One can only speculate that some lastminute missions to Moscow by several NATO-country politicians, such as Canada’s Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, may have been pursuing this line – and it is entirely
possible that such efforts fell on ears as deaf in Moscow as in the chamber of the North Atlantic
Council in Brussels. Here, to reiterate, the argument is not that Russia was blameless in helping
construct its own marginalisation.
In the event, NATO continued both to insist that its troops were a bottom-line part of the
Rambouillet “agreement” and to promise military strikes if Yugoslavia (Serbia) did not “agree.”
After Serbia refused to sign on these terms at Rambouillet, Serbian armed forces accelerated their
military “campaign” in Kosovo, upping the ante. NATO responded by making good on its threats
and launching a massive air campaign. The ferocity of Serbia’s assault (or reports of it) in Kosovo
escalated and the bombing of Belgrade and much of the rest of Serbia intensified. Eventually, after
months of NATO bombing while refugee outflows and atrocities continued throughout Kosovo,
the above-noted Russian diplomacy played a central role in orchestrating the terms of withdrawal of
Yugoslav forces and the insertion of a UN force side by side with a transitional NATO presence.
Russian troops were also made part of the UN mission set up by the Security Council. After a facesaving dash to beat NATO to Kosovo’s Pristina airport, 31 they settled into a largely professional and
co-operative relationship with the other UN mission countries and with NATO – according to the
laudatory comments of UK General Jackson in an interview with Spain’s El Pais paper at the time of
his departure as military head of the Kosovo mission in October 1999. 32
With the above sequence of events in mind, let us now consider the NATO decision not to
negotiate the shape of a Rambouillet military force and to start bombing when Serbia refused to sign
at Rambouillet. Two important members of the UN other than Russia – China and India – reacted
with outrage. (Here, I am assuming that neither China’s nor India’s reaction was on par with one
interpretation of Russia’s reaction, that is, Heathroweque – staged.) Is it naïve to pay attention to
these polemics? Can such outrage be readily dismissed as either legalistic or as the self-serving
stance of states with their own Kosovos to worry about? Such responses would be far too glib, for
the NATO intervention was not only about protection of civilians. It was about the complicated
business of coercive restructuring of a state’s constitutional order.
Consider the legal state of affairs at the time all this was going on. Without the overriding
31

Judah, Kosovo, supra note 2 at --.

32

[Cit to El Pais]
10

authority of the Security Council to endorse Rambouillet under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,
“agreement” could not be imposed by outside states absent two signatures – at least, not without a
wholesale rejigging of the international legal order around a general recognition of the hegemonic
discretion to use force to advance (subjectively-assessed) world order values. 33 (Whether such a
theory has since insinuated itself, or is insinuating itself, as a legal fact is a question beyond the scope
of this review. 34 ) Nor could the legality of a document with two signatures on the page be easily
assumed; even were Serbia to have joined the Kosovars in formally “consenting” to it, it is a
commonplace of international treaty law that a treaty coerced by force or the threat of force is no
treaty at all, and this principle can surely apply no less to coercing a state into an agreement with
non-state actors. 35
Would the Russia option have been inimical to the combined objectives of peace and justice
in Kosovo? Had a Security Council-centred process brokered a substitution of a Russia-led mission
for the contemplated NATO deployment, there was a very realistic prospect that Russia would have
taken great care to act with a firm sense of its larger responsibilities. Whatever its Machiavellian role
in the lead-up to the Rwanda crisis, France operated relatively evenhandedly when authorised
(belatedly) to go into Rwanda; the US managed to keep excessive self-interest under control when
authorised to go into Haiti. This is not to say that mixed motivations and the prior role of each state
in these countries did not render their subsequent ‘humanitarian’ policing role profoundly
hyprocritical. 36 The only point in offering these kinds of examples is to suggest that Russia would,
in all likelihood, have felt pressure to act with similar circumspection had it either led a UN mission
or been a major participant alongside troops from outside the region, such as from Brazil or India.
To have engaged Russia in such a way would have put Russian prestige on the line and offered the
tangible benefits of deepened support from, and future partnership with, the West. The incentives
for faithful performance of a UN mandate would likely have weighed more heavily than any interest
in a sacrificial siding with Serb violence. This is especially likely given Judah’s revelations about just
how uncommitted official Russia was to Slav solidarity (as opposed to primordial nationalistic
sentiment of some elements within the political spectrum and the military, and of course many an
33
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average citizen). 37 Judah’s account goes further in noting how those in the Russian foreign policy
apparatus were not just uncommitted to Serbia but also found Milosevic a profoundly odious
politician to be in bed with. 38
Had the scene shifted from NATO’s Brussels to the UN’s New York, Milosevic need not
have been given everything he was demanding. First of all, there could have been no question of
allowing Yugoslavia to join Russia and Belarus in military alliance. Secondly, any UN force would
had to have had a Russia-led quality without being exclusively Russian and Belarussian. The UN
mission would need a critical mass of non-NATO troops from such nations as Brazil or India and
possibly from certain regional states not members of NATO (such as Ireland and Sweden). Finally,
given the state of Russia’s finances, funding would have been a major stumbling block, such that
NATO states would have had to agree to fund at least Russia’s component of the UN operation.
A number of mutually supportive results might possibly thereby have been achieved.


Systemic concerns about the rule of law and the future authority of the Security Council would
have been treated as being as important as the credibility of NATO.



Milosevic would have had a way to save face, but, if he had refused to accept a version of his
own counter-proposal, Russia and China would have been more likely to have been persuaded to
support a UN-based defence of Kosovo (even if only by abstaining on a Security Council vote to
authorise NATO intervention).



It would have taken seriously the desirability of engaging Russia rather than treating Russia as
the sick man of Eurasia to be ignored or bought off.



The spirit of compromise between Russia and NATO could have had some symbolic effects,
however small, for the engagement of the Yugoslavian communities under Rambouillet.
It is now late summer of 2000. Kosovo has, by many accounts, disappeared from the radar

screen of European states in terms of being a financial priority. As for news coverage, the most we
get is sporadic coverage of the anti-Serb campaign of vengeful violence and purifying displacement
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that has been occurring in the new Kosovo – a campaign that NATO and the UN have not
prevented. 39 More attention is paid to soap-opera like coverage of the state of affairs in Serbia
proper, with a near-total focus on one man and whether he will stay in power.
Meanwhile, in Kosovo, Russian troops have not broken out of the professional and co-operative
mode noted in October 1999 by General Jackson. 40 They have not sided in any active way with the
remaining Serb civilian population of Kosovo. Back in Russia, of course, the leadership, notably
President Putin, seem to have become characters straight out of Dr. Strangelove with their senseless
and brutal conduct in Chechnya. The Russian lamb in Kosovo co-exists with the rogue bear in
Chechnya. There seems little reason to suppose that this bifurcated approach would not also have
been the case had Russia in fact ended up leading a Rambouillet/UN mission. Indeed, it is more
than arguable that Russia would have had to comport itself as a model of responsibility in Kosovo in
order to present its account of the conflict in Chechnya as that of a reasonable actor not given to
unnecessary use of military force.
We should also keep in mind that, if the counterfactual of a Russia-led mission in Kosovo had
happened, the massive NATO bombing campaign of Serbia also would not have taken place. And if
that bombing had not taken place, Russians would not now be reacting with disbelief and ire to
Western condemnation of the Chechnya campaign which they see (with whatever lack of nuance) as
little more than the mirror image of the policy of the West in Kosovo. Had Kosovo been handled
differently—not just by NATO states but also by Russia itself -- Russia would have been engaged as
the West’s partner on the international stage, and, as such, would now be more susceptible to
entreaties to act humanely in Chechnya. Russian domestic politics would also have been deprived of
two handy discourses (that of double standards and that of nationalistic paranoia) which unworthy
politicians are adept at using in order to rally the support of their home audiences.

39

On occasion, renewed interest is generated by decisions and reports with respect to whether NATO

military officials and government leaders bear any legal responsibility for alleged breaches of international
humanitarian law (this being quite apart from the legality of the intervention itself, which, it is fair to say, is
not a central concern in international discourse). See, e.g., the reports of Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch, -----; and the decision of the new Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, -----, who has declined to investigate any further the criminal law culpability of NATO
decisionmakers.
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[refer back to earlier El Pais footnote]
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